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INTRODUCTION

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that "No state shall ... deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ....-1His-

torically, in the field of criminal procedure, courts have held the
due process clause to prohibit the admission into evidence of coerced

1. U.S. CONST. amend.

XIV, § 1.
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or involuntary 2 confessions. 3 In every case in which the United States
Supreme Court found a confession to be involuntary, the Court
4
reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial.
Recently, in Arizona v. Fulminante,5 the United States Supreme
Court considered whether harmless error analysis applies to the admission into evidence of a coerced confession in violation of the
due process clause. To reach this question, the Supreme Court divided the case into three issues: (1) whether the confession had been
coerced; (2) if coerced, whether harmless error analysis could be
applied; and (3) if harmless error did apply, whether admission of
the coerced confession was harmless given the facts of the case.6
Ultimately, a deeply divided Court held that harmless error analysis did apply to the admission of a coerced confession into evidence. 7 Then, a different majority of the Court held that the error
was not harmless in the case before it. 8 The Fulminante decision
has inspired much comment but little agreement regarding its implications for constitutional law and the criminal justice system.9
This comment discusses Arizona v. Fulminante to permit a more
accurate understanding of the decision and its potential influence in
the areas of constitutional rights and criminal procedure. The holding is complex, consisting essentially of three parts, each with a
corresponding dissent and further complicated by the logical relationship between those parts. The decision within each part is close,

2. A coerced or involuntary confession is defined in the following manner: "Confession is
'involuntary' if it is not the product of an essentially free and unrestrained choice of its maker or
where maker's will is overborne at the time of the confession." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 827 (6th
ed. 1990). As used throughout this comment, and by the United States Supreme Court, the terms
"coerced" and "involuntary" are synonymous.
3. WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.6, at 1001-05 (abr.
student ed. 1985).

4. Id.
5. 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991)

6. Id. at 1248-49.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Martin Tolchin, Defense Lawyers Assail Court Ruling on Coerced Confessions,
N.Y. Tnms, March 28, 1991, at B0. But see, Daniel J. Capra, Involuntary Confession and Harmless
Error, N.Y. L.J., May 10, 1991, at 3.
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and the justices comprising the majority vary from one part to the
next.
First, the prior applicable law will be described. Prior law will
be divided into two separate categories: the establishment of the
voluntariness doctrine as the appropriate measure of a coerced confession, and the development of the doctrine of harmless constitutional error. Second, the facts of Fulminante will be recounted.
Third, the holding of Fulminante will be analyzed in the order of
its three parts. The first part will discuss the question of coercion.
The second part will consider the application of harmless error analysis to admission of a coerced confession into evidence. The third
and final part will examine the application of harmless error analysis
to the facts of the case. Finally, this comment will discuss the implications of the Fulminante decision.
II.

PRIOR LAW

Two different lines of prior law are relevant in considering Fulminante, that involving the coerced or involuntary confession, and
that involving harmless constitutional error. Fulminante might reasonably be considered a clash of two legal doctrines with very different aims. Their contrary intent can be characterized in a single
question. How much efficiency can be added to the administration
of justice before constitutional rights are effectively compromised?
A.

Coerced Confession

The notion of "voluntariness", whether the accused confesses
voluntarily or someone forces him to confess, originates in eighteenth century England.10 Prior to that time, courts admitted any
type of confession, including those induced by force." The requirement that a confession be voluntary to be admissible as evidence
originates with a concern for reliability. 12 Courts proscribed only
those activities that they believed likely to induce a false confession. 3
10. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 3, § 6.2, at 264.
11. Id.
12. Id.

13. Id.
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This common law rule influenced early United States Supreme Court
decisions. Then, in 1897, Brain v. United States 4 added something
new to the old formula. 5 In Bram, the Court suggested that "any
direct or implied promises, however slight ' 1 6 or even the "exertion
of any improper influence' ' t7 by the authorities would be enough
to invalidate a confession. Bram and other early Supreme Court
opinions did not consider due process issues, and the Court neither
developed nor applied the idea that voluntariness meant something
8
more than reliability of testimony.'
Thirty-nine years later, in Brown v. Mississippi,19 the Court held
that the admission of a coerced confession violates the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court found the situation
in Brown to be so extreme, and the coercion so blatant and brutal 0
that the holding might still have been based on the old reliability
standard, despite the Court's reference to the Fourteenth Amendment.2 '
In subsequent cases, the Court clarified that coercion could be
psychological as well as physical and that reliability is not the only
reason for due process. 22 In 1957, Fikes v. Alabama23 established

14. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 542-43.
17. Id. at 543.
18. LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 3, § 6.2, at 264-65.
19. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
20. In the spring of 1934, over a span of four days, three men were arrested, accused of murder,
and tortured until they confessed to having committed the crime. Although both trial and state appellate courts were informed of the whippings and hangings that were employed to obtain the confessions, and despite there being no evidence save the confessions, the men were convicted of murder
and their convictions affirmed. As a dissenting member of the state appellate court wrote "Further
details of the brutal treatment to which these helpless prisoners were subjected need not be pursued.
It is sufficient to say that in pertinent respects the transcript reads more like pages torn from some
mediaeval account than a record made within the confines of a modern civilization which aspires to
an enlightened constitutional government." Brown v. State, 161 So. 465, 470 (Miss. 1935) (Griffith,
J., dissenting). Referring to the appellate court's majority holding he added: "To my mind it would
be as becoming a court to say that a lynching party has become legitimate and legal because the
victim, while being hung by the mob, did not object in the proper form of words at precisely the
proper stage of the proceedings." Id. at 472.
21. LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 3, § 6.2, at 265.
22. See, e.g., Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315
(1959); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
23. 352 U.S. 191 (1957).
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the "totality of the circumstances" test as the correct measure of
voluntariness. In Fikes, the Court noted that the case lacked certain
seemingly important elements, such as physical brutality or prolonged questioning in relays, from previous coerced confession cases.2 4
Nevertheless, the Court recounted a number of troubling elements,
such as the lengthy questioning of a prisoner of low intelligence,
held far from home and incommunicado for several days, despite
the efforts of his father and a lawyer.2 Apparently unwilling to
single out a particular element as dispositive, the Court concluded
that the "totality of the circumstances" leading up to the confession
had gone "beyond the allowable limits" and constituted a denial
of due process.2 6 Taking into account the personal characteristics of
the accused, the tactics of the police and the effect of the entire
situation on the will of the accused, this standard remains the test
of voluntariness to the present day.27
In 1963, in Blackburn v. Alabama 2 8 the Court reviewed several
past cases, 29 and noted that the prohibition of the use of coerced
confessions relied upon a "complex of values" and that "the role
played by each in any situation varies according to the particular
circumstances of the case. ' 30 In this complex of values, the Court
included the reliability of the confession and protection of the "individual's freedom of will", 3' but the Blackburn opinion stressed
unacceptable police practices. 32
24. Id. at 197.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Fulninante, III S. Ct. at 1252. The voluntariness test has been subject to considerable criticism. See LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 3, § 6.2, at 266-69. The authors discuss the
need for a clear rule to guide both police and lower courts, and note that the voluntariness test invites
manipulation by the court. See also Yale Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents. Some
Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MicH. L. REv.
59 (1966), for a strong argument that the voluntariness test provides virtually no protection for the
accused.
28. 361 U.S. 199 (1960).
29. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (other evidence establishing guilt or corroborating
the confession is immaterial); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957) (the totality of the circumstances
is reviewed); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (coercion can be mental as well as physical).
30. Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 207.
31. Id.
32. Id. See also LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 3, § 6.2, at 265-66 (discussing the values underlying the voluntariness requirement). But see Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (individual
freedom of will may not matter in the absence of coercive police methods).
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In the cases that deal with coerced confession, the application
of the voluntariness test, considering the totality of the circumstances, occupies the Court. Once the Court completes the voluntariness test and a confession is held coerced, the decision becomes
simple. From Brown on, whenever the Court determined that a trial
court had admitted a coerced confession into evidence, the result
was an automatic reversal. a3 This result was held to be necessary
regardless of the amount of evidence presented in addition to the
confession 34 and the Court confirmed automatic reversal as recently
as 1978. 35
B. Harmless ConstitutionalError
For the better part of the twentieth century, there appeared to
be no such thing as harmless constitutional error. A constitutional
error resulted in an automatic reversal.16 In the 1960's, the due process revolution occurred. With the increasing federal control of what
had been purely state procedural matters on the basis of preserving
the constitutional rights of the accused, the Court also recognized
37
that harmless constitutional error could exist.
Historically, the harmless error statutes adopted by the states
called for the review of the trial record, to see if the proceeding as
a whole had resulted in a miscarriage of justice. 8 In the application
of harmless error analysis to the presentation of evidence, the factors
of greatest importance were the weight of the evidence and the likely
effect of the error on the jury's decision. 9 The essential question
for a harmless error test is whether or not the error had a significant
impact on the judgment of the jury. 40 The standards used by state
courts in applying a harmless error test vary considerably. 4' They
33. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1253.

34. See, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528
(1963).
35. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
36. LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 3, § 26.6, at 1000.

37. Id.
38. Id. at 996.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 997-1000.
41. Id.
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include various levels of probability that the error did not affect the
verdict and comparisons of the error's impact with the weight of
the evidence presented.42 After every state had established some kind
of harmless error rules, the Supreme Court, after years of doubt,
held that harmless constitutional error could also exist, and attempted, in Chapman v. California43 to state guidelines for its application. 44
The Chapman holding recognizes that some constitutional error
is likely to be as harmless as any other error and that nothing inherent in constitutional error calls for automatic reversal. 45 Consequently, the harmless constitutional error test requires "the
beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict
obtained." ' 46 Chapman also states that prior cases have established
a rule of automatic reversal for certain types of constitutional error
that can never be held' harmless. 47 The Court clearly believed that
the rule of automatic reversal still applied to many types of constitutional error and that the three cases listed in Chapman48 were
simply representative of the many types of error that still demanded
automatic reversal. 49.
The Court held that a coerced confession admitted in violation
of the due process right still called for reversal as recently as 1985.50

42. Id.
43. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).

44. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 3, § 26.6 at 1001-05.
45. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22.
46. Id. at 24.
47. Id. at 23. The Court provides three illustrative cases in a footnote. The first of the cases
listed is Payne v. Arkansas, a coerced confession case. The Chapman Court does not distinguish the
three cases in any way, and the reasonable conclusion, that the admission of a coerced confession
can never be harmless error but demands automatic reversal is explicitedly stated in a subsequent

opinion that was joined by then Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor. See Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570,
577-78 (1985).

48. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 n.8.
49. Id. See also LAFAvE & IsAEL, supra note 3, § 26.6, at 1001-05 (discussing the meaning
of Chapman relative to the rule of automatic reversal).
50. Rose, 478 U.S. at 577-78. In explaining why the extension of harmless error to an erroneous
malice instruction is appropriate, the Court distinguishes the admission of a coerced confession, and
states essentially the same argument as Justice White in Fulminante.
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In 1972, however, in Milton v. Wainwright,51 the Court held that
admission of a confession in violation of the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel5 2 was harmless error. Commentators were left to conclude
that although the impact on the jury would not be inherently different from admission of a coerced confession, the lack of any element of coercion made the case distinguishable.a
In the years following Chapman, the harmless constitutional error test was extended to include many types of error, including among
others: faulty jury instructions, erroneous exclusion of evidence, restrictions on cross-examination and admission of evidence obtained
in violation of the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause and
the Sixth Amendment Counsel and Confrontation Clauses. 4 Their
review of State v. Fulminante gave the Court the opportunity to
confirm a line of cases reaching back to Brown in 1936, or to overturn those cases and substantially alter the common understanding
of Chapman. Chief Justice Rehnquist claims to have done neither.55
C. The Meaning of Payne and Chapman
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White cite liberally
in Fulminante to several cases involving coerced confession and
harmless constitutional error,56 their strongest disagreement revolves
around two cases: Payne v. Arkansas, a coerced confession case;
and Chapman v. California, the seminal harmless constitutional error case. Portions of each of these cases must be examined in more
detail to consider the merits of the opinions in Fulminante.
In addition to noting that all previous Supreme Court coerced
confession cases resulted in reversal upon a finding of coercion,
Justice White stresses the following passage from Payne:
Respondent suggests that, apart from the confession, there was adequate evidence

before the jury to sustain the verdict. But where, as here, a coerced confession

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

407 U.S. 371 (1972).
U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
LAFAvE & IsRAEL, supra note 3, § 26.6, at 1005.
Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1263.
Id. at 1263-66.
Id. at 1253-54, 1263.
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constitutes a part of the evidence before the jury and a general verdict is returned,
no one can say what credit and weight the jury gave to the confession. And in
these circumstances this Court has uniformly held that even though there may
have been sufficient evidence, apart from the coerced confession, to support a

judgment of conviction, the admission in evidence, over objection, of the coerced
confession vitiates the judgment because it violates the Due Process Clause of
5
the Fourteenth Amendment. '

Justice White argues that Payne clearly states the rule: when an
involuntary confession is admitted into evidence, a judgment of conviction must be overturned due to the violation of the Due Process
Clause.
The Chief Justice's response in Fulminante is, in essence, to argue that since harmless error is not mentioned in Payne, it was not
ruled out by the Payne Court. This response is disingenuous at best.
Payne dates from 1957 and the Court did not recognize the existence
of harmless constitutional error until Chapman in 1966. Had counsel
suggested harmless error in 1957, the Court would have dismissed
it. Cheif Justice Rehnquist ignores what Payne clearly states, and
what Justice White virtually shouts in Fulminante: upon a finding
that a coerced confession has been admitted into evidence, the Supreme Court has always overturned the conviction, on the basis of
violation of the Due Process Clause and because the impact of the
violation is impossible to judge.
The next bone of contention is a passage from Chapman: "Although our prior cases have indicated that there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never
be treated as harmless error, . . . [not] all trial errors which violate
the Constitution automatically call for reversal.' ' s Footnote eight
lists three cases: Payne v. Arkansas, a coerced confession case; Gideon v. Wainwright, a right to counsel case; and Tumey v. Ohio, an
59
impartial judge case.
Justice White sees this language as support for the proposition
that, among the rights so basic to a fair trial that their violation
can never be treated as harmless, are the right to counsel, the right
57. Payne, 356 U.S. at 567-68.
58. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
59. Id.
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to an impartial judge and the right to be free from coercion. Chief
Justice Rehnquist dismisses the language as a mere "historical
reference"0 to the holdings of those three cases, noting that Chapman does not actually hold that harmless error does not apply to
a coerced confession. Justice White would undoubtedly agree that
the language does refer to the holding of Payne, and that it shows
that the Chapman Court clearly considered admission of a coerced
confession, as in Payne, to be well beyond the scope of harmless
error analysis. Whatever the Chief Justice actually believes, his argument may be characterized as follows: even if the Court issues
the same ruling on the same issue several times in several different
cases, no rule exists and stare decisis does not apply.
III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Two days after Oreste Fulminante reported to the Mesa, Arizona,
police that his 11-year old stepdaughter was missing, her body was
found in the desert outside the city. 6' An unknown assailant had
killed her by shooting her twice in the head with a large caliber
firearm. 62 Police suspected Fulminante but brought no charges against
him. 63 He subsequently moved to New Jersey, where authorities arrested and imprisoned him on a federal charge of firearms possession
by a convicted felon.64
While serving his term in a federal penitentiary in New York,
Anthony Sarivola, an informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, befriended Fulminante. 65 Sarivola posed as an organized
crime figure while serving sixty days for a conviction on charges of
extortion.66 He had worked for organized crime while serving as a
uniformed police officer. 67 Sarivola reported to the FBI that other

60. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. at 1264.
61. Id.at 1250.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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prison inmates thought Fulminante was a child-murderer, and they
instructed him to find out more. 61
After several fruitless conversations, but aware of Fulminante's
poor treatment at the hands of his fellow prisoners, Sarivola approached Fulminante and offered to help him if he would talk about
the murder. 69 In response, Fulminante made a detailed confession,
admitting that he had taken his stepdaughter out to the desert, where
he choked her, assaulted her sexually and shot her to death. 70
Fulminante completed his term in prison. On the day of Fulminante's release, Sarivola and his fiancee, Donna, picked Fulminante up. 7' Over one year later, Sarivola reported to authorities that,
while riding with them, Fulminante had confessed to the murder in
detail a second time, in response to Donna Sarivola's asking him
72
why he did not return to Arizona.
The Arizona authorities indicted Fulminante for the first-degree
murder of his step daughter. 73 Before trial, Fulminante attempted
to exclude the two confessions to Sarivola from use as evidence,
arguing that the first was coerced and the second followed from
it. 4 The trial court found the confessions to be voluntary and permitted their use as evidence. 75 The trial resulted in a conviction and
76
a sentence of death for Fulminante.
He appealed his conviction on the the grounds that Sarivola coerced the first confession and its admission into evidence violated
his right to due process guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution.7 The Supreme Court of Arizona
acknowledged the element of coercion, but held that admission at
trial constituted harmless error given the second detailed confession

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at
72. Id. at
73. Id. at
74. Id. at
75. Id.at
76. Id.
77. Id.

1258-59.
1259.
1250.
1250-51.
1251.
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and the other circumstantial evidence presented. 78 Fulminante moved
for reconsideration of the opinion on the basis of several issues.
The court, however, found merit in only one. 79 The court reversed
Fulminante's conviction on the ground that admission of a coerced
confession in violation of the due process clause requires automatic
reversal. 80 The State petitioned the United States Supreme Court for
certiorari on the question of whether admission at trial of a coerced
confession is subject to harmless error analysis, and the Court granted
the petition.8'
To reach the question posed by the State, the Supreme Court
divided the issue of the case into three separate questions: (1) whether
the confession was coerced; (2) if coerced, whether harmless error
analysis is applicable; and, (3) if applicable, whether the admission
of the confession into evidence was harmless under the circumstances
of the case. 82 The resulting opinion is complex. 83
Ultimately, a majority of the Supreme Court determined that
Sarivola coerced Fulminante's first confession.8 4 A different majority
concluded that harmless error applies to coerced confessions.85 Upon
application of the harmless error test, a third majority held that
admission of the confession had not been harmless and that a new
trial should be granted to Fulminante.8 6
78. Id.
79. State v. Fulminante, 778 P.2d 602, 626 (Ariz. 1988) (dismissing as meritless the contentions
that the harmless error analysis was incorrect and that the second confession was the product of the
first, among other claims).
80. Id.
81. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1251.
82. Id. at 1248-49.
83. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court regarding the voluntariness of the confession, in which Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and Scalia joined. Chief Justice Rehnquist

filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter joined. Chief Justice
Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court regarding the applicability of harmless error analysis,

in which Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Souter joined. Justice White filed a dissenting
opinion, in which Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined. Justice White delivered the opinion
of the Court regarding whether the admission of the coerced confession was harmless error, in which
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined. Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion. Chief
Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices O'Connor and Scalia joined. Id. at
1249.
84. Id. at 1261.

85. Id.
86. Id.
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ANALYSIS OF THE HOLDING

Coerced Confession or Voluntary?
1.

The Majority Opinion

Justice White, writing for the majority, noted that the Court
granted certiorari in this case to determine "whether the admission
at trial of a coerced confession is subject to a harmless-error analysis" given the divergence of opinion among the circuits. Justice
White dismissed the State's contention that the Arizona court applied the wrong standard in assessing coercion. He stated that the
court below had clearly applied the correct "totality of the circumstances" standard.88 Justice White then reviewed the reasoning of
the Arizona Supreme Court in applying the correct standard. 89 He
noted that the record included considerable evidence of Fulminante's
heightened susceptibility to coercion: his lack of education, his small
physical size and his documented adverse reaction to the conditions
routinely found in prison.90 Justice White also noted Sarivola's status
as an apparent friend of Fulminante as a factor influencing the
determination of voluntariness. 91
Although the Court generally defers to the factual findings of
the lower court, the issue of "voluntariness", Justice White stated,
constitutes a legal question that the Court must determine independently. 92 Justice White agreed with the finding of the Arizona court,
noting that the facts of the case presented a close question. 9 In
affirming the lower court he relied on prior holdings indicating that
mental coercion is impermissible and that actual physical violence
need not be present or threatened. 94 Finally, he compared Sarivola's
offer of help to Fulminante to the protection from a lynch mob

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

1251.
1251-52.
1252.
1252 n.2.
1252.
1253.
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that had been promised to the accused, and held to be coercion, in
Payne v. Arkansas.95
2.

The Rehnquist Dissent

Chief Justice Rehnquist began by stating the findings of his own
three-part opinion: (1) Fulminante's confession was voluntary, (2)
harmless error analysis applies to coerced confessions, and (3) Fulminante's first confession was harmless given the weight of the remaining evidence against him.9 6 He then proceeded to consideration
of the "voluntariness" question as an independent federal determination, 97 quoting Culombe v. Connecticut98 to the effect that the
essential question is whether or not the confession is a product of
free will. 99 Chief Justice Rehnquist failed to add that the Court must
apply the "totality of the circumstances" standard to resolve that
question. 100
Focusing instead on certain stipulations made by Fulminante at
a suppression hearing held at the trial level, 10' Chief Justice Rehnquist ackowledged but apparently discounted Sarivola's statements
that he believed Fulminante to be in mortal danger, that Fulminante
had received "rough treatment" from other inmates and that Sarivola offered protection conditioned on Fulminante's telling the truth
about the murder. 10 2 He stressed that Fulminante had never actually
told anyone that he feared his fellow prisoners and that he had not
asked Sarivola for the protection that Sarivola offered. 03 Absent
evidence of any fear or anxiety on the part of Fulminante prior to
the confession, Chief Justice Rehnquist claimed the finding of coercion rested on an assumption contrary to Fulminante's stipulated
actions. °4 Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized Fulminante's prior

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

356 U.S. 560 (1958).
Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1261.
Id.
367 U.S. 568 (1961).
Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1261.
Id.
Id. at 1261-62.
Id. at 1261-63.
Id.
Id.
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felony convictions and characterized him as "an experienced habitue
of prisons."'' 0 He presumed Fulminante to be "able to fend for
himself," 0 6 despite the clear evidence to the contrary cited by Justice
White. 107 Chief Justice Rehnquist likened Fulminante's situation to
cases involving informants, 08 but failed to note that, in the cases
listed, none of the informants had made an offer of protection to
a suspect who was in danger. 10 9
B. Violations of the Due Process Clause Subject to Harmless
Error Analysis
1. The Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist opened the only part of his opinion that
spoke for the majority with a reference to Chapman v. California
as the precedent-setting case establishing the existence of harmless
constitutional error."10 Listing cases since Chapman that had applied
the harmless constitutional error test to various types of error, he
concluded that "trial error" constituted the common thread connecting the cases."' He defined trial error as "error which occurred
during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which may
therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence
presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless
2
beyond a reasonable doubt."1"
Chief Justice Rehnquist stressed that harmless error analysis
guaranteed the "underlying fairness of the trial" while avoiding the
distraction of "virtually inevitable" but "immaterial" error."' He
dropped the introductory explanation at that point and attacked the
4
White dissent. 1
105. Id. at 1263.
106.
107.
108.
109.
Hoffa v.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id. at 1252 n.2.
Id. at 1262-63
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971);
United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1263.
Id. at 1263-64.
Id. at 1264.
Id. (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986)).
Id.
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Quoting Chapman, to the effect that "there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never
be treated as harmless error" Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that
the quoted passage and the subsequent footnote, containing three
illustrative cases, did not state a rule that involuntary confession
requires automatic reversal.)1 5 He argued that the three types of cases
referred to in the Chapman footnote constitute only historical references to past holdings. 1 6 Chief Justice Rehnquist quoted the paragraph from Payne"7 that has been commonly understood to say
that a coerced confession demands reversal since "no one can say
what credit and weight the jury gave to the confession."" 8 He added
that it was "apparent" that the Payne Court had not rejected the
subsequent Chapman "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" test,
but had referred to a more lenient "enough other evidence to convict" standard. The state had offered this lenient standard and the
dissent accepted it in Payne."9
Chief Justice Rehnquist followed his explications of Payne and20
Chapman with further explanation of the nature of "trial error.'
He distinguished it from what he termed a "structural defect" that
precluded application of the harmless error analysis.' 2 ' A structural
defect, as defined by the Chief Justice, affects the "framework" of
the trial, unlike a simple evidentiary "trial error" that occurs within
the trial and can be compared with the rest of the evidence presented
115. Id. But see Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 n.6. Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor
joined the opinion explaining the "rule" of automatic reversal for coerced confession cases and stating
the traditional view of Payne and Chapman.

116. Id. at 1264. Chief Justice Rehnquist fails to note that this interpretation makes the complete
sentence into nonsense, but it appears that he noticed the problem. He spends the next few paragraphs

arguing, in effect, that Payne has been misunderstood for over 30 years, and that the other two cases
in the footnote can be distinguished by applying the terms "trial error" and "structural defect." Id.
at 1264-65.
117. 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
118. Id. at 568.
119. Fulminante, I11 S. Ct. at 1264. Unfortunately, since the Payne paragraph clearly states

that "no one can say what credit and weight the jury gave to the confession" it follows that no one
can ever hold it to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As to Chief Justice Rehnquist's contrast

of the Chapman test and the "lenient" standard, the contrast is not that clear. See, e.g., LAFAVE
& ISRAEL, supra note 3, § 26.6, at 1005-08, and consider Part III of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion
in light of the hypothetical future case at 1008.
120. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1264-65.
121. Id. at 1264-65.
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within the trial.' He then categorized admission of a coerced confession as a trial error, and compared it to other types of potentially
harmless trial error as being indistinguishable in its impact on the
jury.'2
Chief Justice Rehnquist listed cases in which the Court had applied the harmless error test and argued that the evidentiary impact
of such errors was potentially the same as the impact of a coerced
confession. 24 He denied that a coerced confession could be distinguished, in any meaningful way, from other types of error already
subject to harmless error analysis. 25 Concluding his opinion, Chief
Justice Rehnquist noted that on those occasions when a coerced
confession had an especially dramatic evidentiary impact, it would
be held not harmless by the reviewing court.1 26 He added that the
Arizona Supreme Court's original opinion held Fulminante's first
confession harmless. 127
2. The White Dissent
In dissent, Justice White refused to apply harmless error analysis
to the admission of a coerced confession and accused the majority
of overturning a long line of precedent reaching back to 1944.128
Justice White characterized the majority argument as maintaining
the admission of a coerced confession into evidence as indistinguishable from other types of trial error and therefore subject to
the identical harmless error test. 29 Justice White insisted that the
admission of a coerced confession is fundamentally different from
other types of evidence. He claimed the Court had recognized this
difference in Chapman and quoted the same passage used by Rehn3
quist in the majority opinion.1 0
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1265-66.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1266. The implied simplicity of this task is called into question by the disparate
opinions rendered by the Justices in Arizona v. Fulminante and by the Arizona Supreme Court in
State v. Fulminante, 778 P.2d 602 (Ariz. 1988).
127. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1266.
128. Id. at 1253-54.

129. Id. at 1254.
130. Id.
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Justice White cited four cases following Chapman as evidence
of its meaning and attacked the majority reasoning regarding both
the holding in Payne and the contrast of "trial error" with "structural defect"."' Payne, claimed Justice White, stands for a requirement of automatic reversal "regardless of the amount of other
evidence,1 1 2 because the effect of the confession on the jury's verdict cannot be determined and harmless error cannot therefore be
applied.' Justice White countered the "trial error-structural defect"
dichotomy with an example of an apparent trial error, given the
Rehnquist definition, that could never be held harmless: the failure
to instruct the jury regarding the reasonable doubt standard, exemplified by Jackson v. Virginia.3 4 He contrasted this with a jury
instruction on the presumption of innocence, as in Kentucky v.
Whorton ,35 which could be harmless error. 3 6 Justice White argued
that the lack of a reasonable doubt instruction would be both a
"trial error" and a "structural defect" if the jury convicted the
defendant, and that the admission of a coerced confession into evidence presented the same problem. 37
Justice White went on to state that a confession constitutes the
most damaging evidence that can be brought against a defendant,
making it distinctly different from all other types of evidence. 38 He
argued that the element of coercion is the essential difference between the coerced confession and all other types of error to which
harmless error analysis had been applied. 39 He then denied Rehnquist's claim that no meaningful distinction between confessions in

131. Id. at 1254-55.
132. Id. at 1254. It can be argued that Justice White mistakes the meaning of the Chapman

harmless error test. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 3, § 26.6, at 1005-08. It seems more reasonable,
since Payne predates Chapman, to claim that Payne supports automatic reversal, than to claim, as
Chief Justice Rehnquist does, that since Payne does not mention the nonexistent (in 1948) constitutional harmless error standard, it does not rule it out. In 1948, harmless error had never been held
to apply to any constitutional error.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1255.
443 U.S. 307 (1979); Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1255.
441 U.S. 786 (1979).
Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1255.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1256.
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violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments could be made.' 40
Justice White gave the traditional explanation for the reversal
of coerced confession cases. Noting other types of constitutional
error held to result in automatic reversal, he likened them to the
admission of a coerced confession in that all are violations of a
basic constitutional right. 41 He concluded by stating that stare decisis demanded adherence to this long line of established precedent
in the absence of any convincing reason for change. 42
C. Application of the Harmless ErrorAnalysis
1. The Majority Opinion
Justice White began by stating the rule that the record must be
examined to determine if the state had met its burden of demonstrating that the error did not contribute to the conviction. 43 Noting
the unique importance of the confession as evidence, he recalled
that the Arizona Supreme Court had originally found the error to
be harmless and affirmed Fulminante's conviction because of the
full, voluntary and duplicative second confession made to Donna
Sarivola and the circumstantial physical evidence that corroborated
that confession. 44 Justice White stated that the Court had arrived
at the opposite conclusion, that admission of the first confession
affected the verdict, for three reasons: (1) the physical evidence was
inadequate without the confessions' 45; (2) the explanation of the circumstances surrounding the second confession was so unlikely that
belief in the second confession might well have been based on belief
in the first coerced confession; 46 and (3) admission of the first confession led to the admission of other evidence, prejudicial to Fulminante, that would have been inadmissible absent the first
confession. 47 Justice White stressed that the state had not indicted
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1256-57.

142. Id. at 1257.
143. Id.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 1258.
Id.
Id. at 1258-59.
Id. at 1259-60.
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Fulminante until nearly two years after the murder, when the confessions became available as evidence and that this had been specifically recognized in the record. 148 He noted that the two confessions
were mutually reinforcing, less believable when considered independently, and the truthfulness of the Sarivolas so questionable that a
single confession might prove unconvincing.1 49 In conclusion, Justice
White noted that the sentencing judge had relied on information
from both confessions and had specifically focused on the similarities between them, implying that the two confessions had a mutually
reinforcing effect leading to a reasonable doubt that the result would
have been the same had there been only one confession. 10
2.

The Kennedy Concurrence

Despite his belief that Fulminante had voluntarily confessed to
Sarivola in prison, Justice Kennedy stated that he believed it necessary to provide "a clear mandate to the Arizona Supreme Court
in this capital case." 151 He concurred in the judgment that the first
confession had a significant influence on the verdict and therefore
52
could not be considered harmless error.
3.

The Rehnquist Dissent

Chief Justice Rehnquist managed only three sentences in dissent,
stating simply that he believed Fulminante to be a classic case of
trial error with a second voluntary confession that so duplicated the
first that the first had no distinguishable impact on the jury.5 3 The
54
Chief Justice did not discuss any part of the majority view.
V.

CONCLUSION

The response to the Fulminante decision calls to mind the story
of the blind men and the elephant. Each blind man touches a dif-

148. Id. at
149. Id. at
150. Id. at
151. Id. at
152. Id.
153. Id. at
154. Id.

1258.
1258-59.
1260-61.
1267.
1266
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ferent part of the elephant, each comes to a very different conclusion
about the nature of an elephant, but none are accurate. After Fulminante, some commentators claimed that the decision would encourage the police to use coercion in the hope of obtaining enough
additional evidence that, even if the confession were deemed coerced,
its admission into evidence would also be deemed harmless. 55 Others
argued that the police would never dare to use any tactic that could
be considered coercion for fear of the court excluding a voluntary
confession. 56 Some expressed confidence in the consistency of harmless error analysis, noting that Fulminante would get a new trial.
Undoubtedly they would have been even more confident had the
Arizona Supreme Court not originally applied harmless error analysis only to confirm Fulminante's death sentence.
In the courts, Fulminante has been cited as support for the gen1 57
eral application of harmless error analysis to constitutional errors.
But, in U.S. v. Jenkins,18 the court suggested a basis for distinguishing Fulminante, implying that coerced confessions involving
police violence may not fall within the Fulminante harmless error
holding. And in Iowa v. Quintero,159 the court determined that, if
the United States Constitution is not equal to the task after Fulminante, the Due Process Clause of the Iowa Constitution demands
automatic reversal of a conviction following upon the admission of
a coerced confession into evidence. These cases indicate that the
Fulminante decision has not fulfilled its purpose. Fulminante was
reviewed in order to provide a clear answer to the question of whether
harmless error could be applied to the admission into evidence of
a coerced confession. The close and confusing multi-part decision
that resulted, with its shifting majorities and strong conflicting arguments, reflects deep disagreement rather than certainty.
Prior to Fulminante, some argued convincingly that the voluntariness test has never been sufficient to protect the rights of the
155. Eric Neisser, Can Government Coercion Ever Be Harmless?, N.J. L.J., Apr. 25, 1991, at
13.
156. Bruce Fein, Fifth Amendment False Alarm, MANArTrAN LAWYER, June 1991, at 12.
157. United States v. Wilson, 930 F.2d 616, 619 (8th Cir. 1991); Hunter v. Clark, 934 F.2d 856,

860 (7th Cir. 1991).
158. 938 F.2d 934, 942 (9th Cir. 1991).
159. 60 U.S.L.W. 2165, (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 27, 1991).
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accused. With its totality of the circumstances standard, which includes the personality of the accused, the test was easily manipulated. Much like Chief Justice Rehnquist in Fulminante, the lower
courts were free to characterize the accused as a hardened criminal
and therefore capable of resisting techniques that clearly constitute
coercion for the average person. Very few of the questionable cases
were ever likely to reach the Supreme Court. Even the convictions
in Brown v. Mississippi, a case notorious for brutality, survived each
appeal until they reached the United States Supreme Court. Difficulty in applying the voluntariness test in a clear and consistent
manner led to more effective ways of protecting the rights of the
accused, culminating in Miranda. From this point of view, little may
have been lost. Proponents of judicial efficiency effectively agree
when they claim that coerced confession is only rarely the basis of
an appeal. Does this small victory for judicial efficiency mean that
constitutional rights and the ideals of our nation will be further
compromised? Only time and another elephant will tell.

Robert Paul
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